Aesthetics of Identity

Introduction

In his Apt Imaginings, John Gilmore defends an account where the moral value of a work of art is grounded in the purpose and function that it was created to realize.

I suggest that we can discover an internal relation between the artistic and moral value of a work in the relation between, broadly speaking, the moral vision of a wwork of art and the point, purpose, or function it was created to realize. ( Citation: 2020, p. 222 Gilmore, J. (2020). Apt Imaginings: Feelings for Fictions and Other Creatures of the Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096342.001.0001 )

Considering whether some works of art have moral flaws or not, Gilmore argues that such defects are instantiated by the failure of the artist to accurately represent some content. But this says nothing about works of art that do not intend to represent moral content, but rather work towards realizing some divergent end, say entertainment, or financial capital through popularity and sales.

Thus, there are some kinds of reasons that justify an emotion felt toward a state of affairs represented in a fiction or imagining that would not justify that emotion when felt toward an analogous state of affairs in the real world. ( Citation: 2020, p. 132 Gilmore, J. (2020). Apt Imaginings: Feelings for Fictions and Other Creatures of the Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096342.001.0001 )

As such, it is not clear how to criticize such works of art.